That was a poignant reminder of the fundamental illegitimacy of the regimes imposed on central and eastern Europe by the communist occupiers after 1945. At first sight it would seem preposterous to label the new era of chilly relations between Russia and the West as a "new cold war". The terrifying global military confrontation between communism and capitalism, with the heroism and suffering it brought, is dead and buried. And in my book* I am certainly not arguing that it is coming back. But what we have now is a new and more insidious threat. Communism was a hard sell: it didn't work and found few real fans. Now the ex-KGB regime in the Kremlin has adopted capitalism, which works much better, generating more money at home and creating a web of influence abroad. It has also dropped the idea of totalitarian rule. A sham democracy, with some freedom of speech in marginal media such as newspapers, plus freedom to emigrate, has built-in safety valves and is thus more stable.
Thirdly, the Kremlin has given up the idea of maintaining an empire by force. Instead, it uses economic influence, chiefly energy deals but also cash. It can buy politicians, political parties, even whole countries (that seems to be happening now in Iceland). Its best tactic is divide and rule. The big lesson of the invasion of Georgia is not military but political: that the West was unable to muster a response.
The European Union managed only the feeblest possible sanction--temporary suspension of talks on the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement--and has been unable to stick even to that. Russian bilateral ties with countries such as Italy, Austria, Germany and the Netherlands have made the EU and NATO so divided that their credibility is dwindling. The financial crisis weakens the West's moral authority and its muscle.
True, Russia has its problems too: a plunging stock market and a banking system under increasing strain. Some oligarchs are becoming minigarchs (or even nanogarchs). But the main result is more power for the Kremlin. It controls the huge cash reserves built up from the soaring oil and gas revenues of the past eight years. It decides who gets bailed out, and who goes down the plughole. And abroad, it is Russia that has spare cash to play geopolitics.
The West is also distracted by Iraq and Afghanistan. It is likely to be many months before a new American administration is able to focus on the problems of Europe. That leaves an open door for Russia. So the position is troubling, particularly for a country such as Poland which has every reason to worry about a Russian-German axis in European politics. But it is not hopeless. Instead of lobbying inside paralysed multilateral institutions, countries that are willing to stand up to Russia should take action themselves, to complement existing arrangements.
The best chance for Poland is the security partnership now being created by Sweden (non-aligned) with Norway (NATO but not EU) and Finland (neutral). All three countries are deeply worried by developments in Russia. Their new initiative involves close and largely unpublicised cooperation on military procurement, airspace monitoring, planning, training and intelligence. It deals with two areas: the Baltic sea region, and the High North (the seas above Norway, where Russia is pushing hard in both military and economic matters). Teaming up with the nascent Nordic defence partnership offers the best chance for Poland to bolster its own security. Those countries may be richer, but Poland is bigger than all of them combined.
* "The New Cold War: how the Kremlin menaces both Russia and the West" is published by Bloomsbury in English and Atena in Latvian