papildināta - Gruzīni kontrolē ceļu no Tbilisi uz Gori

Loti labi ka nogalinati tikaj 44 ne viss 1500 un vairak , un es par neatkaribu no Gruzijas , tas kar$ sakas ne no 1991, gada bet no 1918, gada, 90 gadus , es domaju tas pietieko$i daudz lai iegut neatkaribu no naidigu valsti (gruzijai), un lidz vienai vietai ka ASV vai latvija, ar to neapmierinata ,

да и хрен с ним. такое дерьмо вы тут пишете - не дай Бог. Хорошо, что я - русский.

dažiem nepielec.

People of the world, the information, provided by the international mass media is no true. Russia DID NOT ATTACK Georgia! 07.08.2008 at 22:00 Georgia attacked South Ossetia, the troops rolled in. At 3:30 08.08.2008 tanks of the Georgian armies have entered the city of Tskhinvali, the capital of the South Ossetian Republic. Whole city was shelling by heavy artillery all day long, there were fights with use of tanks and heavy munition, which were used against both ossetic militia and non-combatants. More than 2000 civillians were killed during Georgian attack. Russian peacemakers have arrived to South Ossetia in the evening of 08.08.2008 for settlement of the conflict and peace conduction in republic and protection of Russian citizens, living on territory of South Ossetia (approx. 80% of South Ossetian population). Georgia has attacked South Ossetia on the opening day of 2008 Olympiad, it is top of cruelty and cynicism.

Un tādu pamatīgu rēķinu Putinam - tiešie zaudējumi, negūtā peļņa u.t.t. - arī sastādiet, lūdzu! Lai kopā ar uzrīdītajiem D-osetīniem lemj, cik kurš maksās.

June 25, 2008 | 1702 GMT RAMZI HAIDAR/AFP/Getty Images A Chechen soldierSummary Russia plans to downsize two battalions of Chechen special-forces troops, the Defense Ministry said June 25. These Chechen soldiers — all former insurgents — have a reputation for brutality, and 1,200 of them may soon be looking for new jobs. Other security forces will absorb some, but many will likely end up returning to militancy or entering the Chechen mafia. Analysis The Russian Defense Ministry has decided to downsize two of its special-forces battalions inside of Chechnya — the Vostok (“east”) and Zapad (“west”) battalions — Russian business daily Kommersant reported June 25. The battalions, each of which comprises about 2,000 ethnic Chechen soldiers, would be cut by 30 percent. A reorganization of these units has been expected for some time, now that the insurgency in Chechnya has died down. The question now is, where will all these highly trained and former militants go? Their release from the special forces will send some into other branches of government service or law enforcement — but some are likely to return to militancy or end up in the Moscow underworld, where they have the potential to unbalance the current power structure. The Russian government created the Vostok and Zapad forces in order to rein in Chechen militancy. Russian forces had been floundering in the region in 1994-1996 and again after 1999, so Moscow decided to switch tactics and use Chechen militants — under Russian control — to fight the Chechen militancy. The plan was to take former militants, train them, pay them and organize them into forces that could combat the insurgency. This shift began to prove successful starting in 2005, and the Chechen War was declared over by the Russian government in 2007. Now, Moscow has begun re-evaluating what exactly to do with these former militants turned pro-Russian soldiers. Pro-Kremlin Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov also has been eager to reorganize the security forces in Chechnya. Partly this is because he wants to pull more forces under his own umbrella security group, referred to as the Kadyrovites. Also, however, the Zapad battalion has been under the control of the only real remaining opposition force to Kadyrov, the Yamadaev brothers. Weakening or co-opting the Zapad forces is another step for Kadyrov in consolidating his power in the small Caucasus republic. The soldiers who are let go will not simply disappear, however. Downsizing these forces by even 30 percent will leave 1,200 former Chechen militants looking for jobs. Chechen special forces have a reputation for brutality and for refusing to play by any typical Russian military rules, but many are expected to feed straight into the Chechen police forces. There is also the possibility that they could move into some of Russia’s other more secretive security forces. However, a return to their militant past is most likely for some Vostok and Zapad troops if they are let go. Many will likely resent the fact that they were used by the Russian government and discarded once the war was over. Those who do return to the militancy will bring their Russian special-forces training with them. There is a third possible future for these free-agent Chechens: the Chechen mafia. Militants have traditionally been part of the Chechen mob, but a shift has taken place in the past few years while these militants-turned-soldiers have been part of the battalions: most of the Chechen mafia is no longer in the Caucasus, but in the Moscow region. In the ranks of the mob, these recruits could act as security personnel or enforcers, and their connections inside the Russian security forces could prove useful. The Kremlin probably is not eager to see an increase in the number of angry Chechen-militants-turned-mobsters around the Russian capital — especially if they have a bone to pick with the Russian government (once again). Moreover, the Russian organized crime groups will not sit by and watch as the ranks of the Chechen mafia swell with men who have militant and special-forces training. The Russian mafia had its own influx of special-forces and security personnel in the 1990s, leaving the Russian mobs highly trained and lethal. The Chechen mob could now see the same escalation in its capabilities. The Chechen and Russian mobs both headquarter in Moscow now and hold a very delicate balance in the city. They work together in many ways — on transportation and killings especially — but they mainly try to keep to their own parts of Moscow in order to avoid open conflict. A sudden increase in highly trained Chechen mobsters has the potential to turn that equilibrium on its head.

Gan jau ka tie čečeni bija Kadirova rokaspuiši, kuri paši savus tautiešus esot laupījuši un slepkavojuši. Bez tam cik esmu runājis ar savu bijušo kolēģi no Dagestānas, tad viņa teica, ka čečeni nekad neesot bijuši nekādi paipuikas un vienmēr esot bijuši viena no kareivīgākajām kaukāza tautām. Tagad gruzīniem pats galvenais ir parādīt pārējai pasaulei, ko krievu un viņu pakalpiņu marodieri ir sadarījuši Gruzijā.

Čečenijā ir dažādi klani un Krievijas imperiālisti veikli izspēlē vienus čečenus pret otriem - tas arī viss. Tradicionāla imperiālistu metode. Ne jau krievi uzvarēja čečenijas karā. Viņi vienkārši dabūja savā pusē daļu no čečenu klaniem (Kadirovu), kurus tad apbruņoja un uzrīdīja citiem '' cečeniem.

mani visvairāk skumdina tas, ka arī čečeņi darbojas pret gruzīniem un marodierē. par maz viņus krievi situši, tā laikam to var saprast.

Bet kāpēc tas, ko Krievija izdarīja Čečenijā ir navedeņije konstitucionnogo porjadka, bet precīzi tas pats, tikai Dienvidosetijā un Gruzijas izpildījumā - agresija? Kāpēc noslaucīt no zemes virsas Chinvali ir noziegums, bet Grozniju - nav? Kāpēc Krievija skaita osetīnu bēgļus, bet neskaita čečenu? Kādu konklāģeri krievi izdomās Černokozovas pretstatam? Piekrītu, Gruzijai sen jau vajadzēja pasūtīt osetīnus un abhāzus, ar varu mīļš nekļūsi. Krievijai separātiskas teritorijas ar islamticīgām tautām Ziemeļkaukāzā vairāk piestāv.

Domāju, ka Jūs stipri maldāties.. Krievija sasniegusi visus savus mērķus, Gruzijai Nato neredzēt iiilgu laiku, osetija un abhazija de fakto pa pusei jau krievijas sastāvā,utt. Savukārt, to krupi par spēka lietošanu rietumi norīs enerģētikas vārdā, parunās un viss.

grani-tv.ru/entries/428/

Nekreņķējies. Vakar paskatījos vienu no Maskavas propogandas taurēm- tur Krievijas izmeklētāji biezā slānī raujas melnām mutēm. Lai gan, vismaz pagaidām, arī viņiem tā īsti nekas nebija ko šausminošu parādīt. Visi locījās ap vienu sadegušu žiguli.

Nu ko konflikts lielā mērā ir beidzies un var izdarīt secinājumus. Konflikta sākums - Krievijas un osetīnu nepārtrauktas provokācijas, kā rezultātā Gūzijai neizturēja nervi, taču pārmest viņiem to nevar, jo tā ir Gruzijas teritorija. Jebkurā gadījumā slikti, ka ir bojā gājušie, taču neticu, ka skaitlis ir virs 1500, visticamāk tā ir Krievijas propoganda . Krievija kapitāli sevi diskriditēja gan kā sadarbības partneri, gan kā miera uzturētāju un tam visticamāk būs smagas sekas starptautiskajā arēnā - neuzņemšana PTO, izslēgšana no G8 utt. Krievijas lielākā kļūda - iziešana ārpus konflikta zonas, tā teikt pārrēķināšanās, kā arī nenovēršot marodierismu gan no osetīnu puses un savu karavīru puses, un tas Krieviju padara par agresoru un pietiekami spilgtu, kā rezultātā šajos seperātiskajos reģionos visticamāk ievedīs ES miera uzturētājus un tiem piešķirs autonomiju, jo to pievienošana Krievijas sastāvā uz doto brīdi izskatās nereāla. Papildus galīgi kreisais notikumu atspoguļojums Krievijas masu informācijas līdzekļos un no Krievijas amatpersonu puses parāda viņu kā klaunus un meļus, kuriem uzticību atgūt būs grūti. Par cik vēl ASV iesaistās humanitārajās operācijās, tad vituvākajā laikā kontroli pār Gruzijas ostām un lidostām pārņems ASV militāristi un Krievijai no turienes būs jāvācās ārā. Rezultāts - smaga pārrēķināšanās no Krievijas puses.

Jā! Un kas pārbaudīs krievu izraisītās sekas ar grad pa grozniju ko a?! Tur viņi starpcitu šava pa saviem tā sauktajiem pilsoņiem! Varoņi ibio! Ne laikam jau atkala alojos tur noteikti atkal bija gruzīni pie vainas, viņi vienīgie ko tadu spēj izdomāt un principā sen jau ir pierādīts, ka grads ir tikai un vienīgi gruzīņiem. Krievi neko tādu pat neražo. un tās tā sauktās gūstekņu spīdzināšanas arī nav. krievi labu gribēdami gruzīņu gūstekņiem grib uztauisīt manikīru un pedikīru lai nagi neieaug un serga neizplatās bet viņi kā aptrakuši raustās un sevi savaino un pēcāk vaino tos,kuri viņus grib tikai glābt.